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Premises
The topic of formulating a strategy is a hard one to address in a
short space of time. Concepts that help with strategy formulation are
evolving and information technology itself is changing, so the impact
of one on the other is complex. As such, it seems important to be
clear about the underlying assumptions before beginning to address
the substance of the question. There are some basic beliefs about
the world and the way it operates which underlie the arguments
developed in this paper.
The first of premises is that information technology (I.T.)
strategies are most effective when they are developed in the context
of business and corporate strategies. Thus a critical first step is
to know where the organization is headed before one begins to work on
the question of what a sensible direction for the use of information
technology should be.
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Such an explicit, statement of strategy assumes implicitly that
the "rational actor" model of the organization is the most effective
one to use. This model has been espoused by a series of authors over
the years, perhaps one of the earliest was Herbert Simon in his New
Science of Management Decision published in 1960. In this view
decision making is thought of as falling into a series of phases. In
Simons terms, "intelligence," "design" and "choice" being the three
principle interactive phases. In light of work since Simon's
publication it seems useful to add a fourth step namely "action."
Thus in this model an organization, or an individual, first defines
the problem, that is' clarifies it, then creates alternatives that
would solve that particular problem, then selects the best of these
alternatives following which they go through implementation, that is,
a set of actions are taken.
This "rational actor" paradigm implicitly underlies much of the
work that is going on in corporate strategy and strategy
formulation. The 'rational actor' paradigm dominates the writing and
research, particularly in the area of methodologies and even more so
as it relates to information technology since many who work in this
area come out of an engineering and science background.
However, there are several alternative models which describe
equally well the activity that takes place in organizations. For
example, there is a large group of managers who seem to successfully
follow a problem-solving process which basically acts first, based
primarily on intuition, then examines the results in an intuitive way
II
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and senses if the results seem to be good. They then cycle back
through to a next set of actions. In this view of management
decision making the action comes first and the analysis comes
second. Such a view turns the standard methodologies for strategy
formulation upside down and there is little prescriptive or normative
writing for managers or academics with this view of the world to act
on. In the comments that follow, the rational actor model is
dominant but is not in any way meant to be exclusive.
The second premise that underlies this paper is that the need for
an explicit view of the organization's strategy is necessary because
of an increasingly turbulent external environment. The premise is
that the next decade is more likely to be one of "economic war" than
"economic peace". It seems that we are entering an era of
discontinuities; overcapacity in industry, increasingly global
competition, rising expectations both of the quality of products and
services as well as expectations as to one's standard of living. If
indeed we are entering a period of continuing economic change then
the management systems and ways of doing business that will be
successful in such a period of change will be different from those in
the past. It is assumed that incremental "business as usual" will
not be adequate in the years ahead.
Although the pace of change is assumed to be higher in the coming
years than it was in the '60s and '70s, it is not assumed that most
of these changes are I.T. related. In fact, quite the reverse;
social, political, global economics, and technologies such as genetic
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engineering are driving organizations. Information technology
enables the organization to facilitate and mediate these changes as
they occur and impact on the organization. As an aside, it could be
argued that information technology facilitates a faster rate of
change, for example, live television coverage in America on
activities in South Africa has undoubtedly increased the awareness
and added to the political pressure for America to respond in some
way. However, by and large, information technology seems to be
facilitating change or enabling it to happen rather than driving it
in a causal way.
A third premise is that information technology is merely one of
several levers by which an organization adjusts to changes in the
external world and in management practices. As is suggested in the
second premise, there is no assumption of a technological
imperative. Strategy to be effective has to be driven by ideas as
they occur to informed capable managers. On balance, it is unlikely
that an effective strategy will be driven by the technology in a way
that brooks no alternatives.
The fourth premise is that strategy formulation is more of an art
than a science and to be effective it should be the province of line
management. Hence; the built-in difficulty of I.T. strategy
formulation. If corporate strategy formulation is an art practiced
differently in different organizations by different managers and if
the resulting strategy is articulated in some firms in great detail
and others scarcely at all, then clearly there is no "science" of
l1
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strategy formulationl It is an observable fact that good strategic
management is all too rare. On top of this scarcity of good
strategic management is the lack of the knowledge of I.T.
capabilities among general managers. Line managers have
traditionally not come out of the information technology field.
Hence, those who know their corporate strategy are often ignorant of
information technology and correspondingly those who understand the
information technology are often uninformed of the corporate
strategy. Hence to be effective there needs to be a shared process
of strategy formulation. This is hard since both bodies of knowledge
are changing rapidly and to some extent one is asking art and science
to mix constructivelyl
Definitions and History
Terminology in a field such as management is woefully undefined
and it turns out that many management terms have widely different
meanings to different people. There are two terms which require
definition for the purpose of this paper. The first of these is
information technology (I.T.) itself. The most important point is
that I.T. is not only computers. There is no clean way of
categorizing I.T. but it consists of at least of the following:
1. Computers - computers are of course a central component of
information technology. There is a full smorgasbord of
these [1] ranging from large mainframe computers all the way
through to the recently arrived personal computers
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and the even smaller, micro computers, that exist in chip
form. Together with this spectrum of computers from
mainframes to micros, exists the wealth of data and
information that is available to an organization in an
electronic form.
2. Telecoms - telecommunications has only recently begun to be
recognized as a full partner with the computer itself as
part of the main structure of information technology. The
range of telecom options can be thought of as follows:
Internal External
Broad Be
Narrow E
In addition to these four cells which are part of the
telecommunications world an organization. must deal with,
there is the additional complexity of having both public and
private networks available to fill each of these cells. It
is hard to capture the powerful difference between a
computer that is isolated, and what the computer becomes in
the hands of the user when it is linked into a network and
has flexible access to information, other computers and
other organizations.
l1
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3. White Collar Productivity Tools - these are commonly known
as office automation and clerical support and could be
thought of as partial robotics for clerical workers. Here
routine, well-structured tasks, such as writing paychecks
and typing standard letters, are done with information
technology tools such as a computer-based workstation for
the clerical worker. Similarly, there are workstations for
managerial workers in the form of computer-based terminals
that deal with management support systems in various forms.
Typically in 1986, these take the form of decision support
systems and executive support systems [2, 3].
4. Blue Collar Productivity Tools - the most obvious case of
blue collar productivity tools are robotics and related
factory automation. However, it is interesting that a great
many other professional workstations are now being installed
where the prime purpose is for the production of the service
itself. These workstations are used by humans not by
machine tools and are closely related to the shop floor in
terms of computer-aided design and computer-aided
engineering. However there are other interesting examples
such as loan officers in banks evaluating loan possibilities
through the use of an interactive work station.
5. Smart Products - in addition to the above four categories of
information technology there is also the inclusion of the
technology into the product itself. Thus we have in a
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modern car several computers in the car to control fuel,
anti-skid brakes as well as information supposedly useful to
the driver in terms of computed fuel consumption, etc.
The important point to make in the context of this paper is that
information technology is only partially computers. Equally
important are the other four categories of information technology
that must be thought of when one thinks about formulating strategies
for I.T. in the context of a corporate strategic move.
The second definition which is important to make for the purpose
of this paper is that of strategy itself. There are literally
hundreds of books on strategy and strategic management in the
literature. Some examples are Strategic Management: A New View of
Business Policy and Planning by Dan Schendel and Charles W. Hofer [4]
or more recently Strategic Management: An Integrative Perspective by
Arnoldo Hax and Nicolas Majluf [5]. This article assumes the content
of these kinds of books is well understood to the reader. The
central point is that strategy is not long range planning, if by long
range planning we mean laying out the step by step path into the
future, starting this from the present and assuming incremental
progress of existing businesses and markets.
The original Greek word from which strategy comes means "the art
of the (military) General."
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For the purposes here, this can be translated into strategy
formulation as being about how to create an appropriate mission, and
to position the organization to accomplish this mission in light of
the reality of its internal strengths and weaknesses, its customers
and the external environment. Strategy formulation is concerned
about the desired positioning of the firm and how to get there.
If one looks at business strategy historically one can see five
phases in the development of the field up to the present time.
1. An early phase merely established for the first time the
desirability of long range planning. Steiner [6] in his
landmark book made a strong case for making explicit a
functionally based (marketing, production, finance, etc.)
plan that covered several years into the future.
2. By the early 1970s the interest had shifted to a focus on
business planning [7]. To oversimplify this point of view,
it was basically one of executives giving top down guidance
to the organization and bottom up plans then coming from the
division and functional levels. These were then put
together for an overall corporate plan.
3. The third phase was that of portfolio planning as espoused
by Bruce Henderson in his 1970s book on Portfolio Planning
[8]. The essence of this approach was to see the
corporation as a series of separate strategic business
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units (SBUs) which by and large had independent products,
markets and missions. These were looked at in terms of
their cash needs and growth possibilities to identify an
appropriate balance in the portfolio of SBU's given the
reality of the maximum sustainable growth for the
corporation. Important to this point of view was the
relative market position vis-a-vis the competition and the
growth potential of the markets served.
4. Industry structure and generic strategies [9] was the next
stage in the evolution strategy formulation methodologies.
Here the analysis was focused on the competitive position of
the firm in the context of the infrastructure of its
industry. The premise was that as industries have very
different structures and dynamics it is important to
understand these before identifying the possible generic
strategy appropriate for the firm itself.
5. The fifth and most recent phase in the evolution of
strategic planning is focused on a value chain [10] approach
which turns the attention back to the inside of the
organization. This technique analyses the internal steps by
which an organization adds value to its product or service.
The point to note with all of these various approaches is that
there has been a steady progression of ideas. There is no reason to
suspect that we have reached any kind of end point in this
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progression and indeed in light of the turbulent environment the
purposes for which strategy formulation must be undertaken will
change. This in turn will demand newer techniques and new concepts
that will prove powerful in helping organizations to formulate their
strategy in an effective way. Thus it can be seen that strategy
formulation is a moving target, and this suggests that linking
strategy formulation to changing information technology is going to
require unusual effort and flexibility.
Conceptual Frameworks
If strategy is indeed a creative line management task then it
follows that there is no formula or technique that will produce an
answer. However it is possible to use frameworks and methodologies
as ways of stimulating ideas, aiding consensus among management, and
generally helping to maintain perspective. It is frameworks from the
last two of the phases mentioned above that appear to be particularly
valuable as a way of stimulating powerful creative methods of linking
IT use for the corporate strategic thrusts. There are a host of
suggested ways of looking at the linkage that have come out of the
major business schools of the last five years [11].
At its core, strategy formulation inevitably involves analysis of
internal strengths and weaknesses and external threats and
opportunities. This is a fundamental equation in any strategic
problem.
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As an example of a framework being used to stimulate creativity
it is possible to take the well known Porter framework that he
developed in his book Competitive Stratecy [12]. In this particular
book he was focusing on the Industrial Organizations economic
literature to establish the framework itself. He then proceeded to
draw implications of the framework for corporate strategy. However,
it can also be used to look at the implications for information
technology. This has been done by a number of academic authors;
perhaps the most visible article is by McFarlan in the Harvard
Business Review. Arguably it is the process by which this framework
is used within the firm that is its principle value. The framework
is suggestive and has some useful categories but there is no way to
generate "answers" unless it is creatively and knowledgeably used by
experienced line managers.
Using Porter's basic diagram (Figure A) of the major categories
of forces it is possible to go through the four areas and identify
opportunities in each. In some organizations this is done formally
with a small group of line managers including an I.T. person, in
others by different combinations of the line and staff. Focusing on
the "buyer" dimension of Porter's diagram, for example, the company
might come up with an idea for an electronic linkage between its
buyers (i.e., its customers) and itself. The linkage gives the
customer an ability to directly choose items that most closely match
their needs, the process also markedly speeds up delivery of the
product to the customer.
III
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A second example of a conceptual framework that has proved to be
very effective for understanding the strategic opportunities inherent
in the internal aspects of the organization is the use of the "value
chain." One of the first published references to its use occurred in
1980 as a result of some work that Strategic Planning Associates
(SPA), a strategic consulting firm in Washington, DC, did with some
of its clients [13]. In practical application, SPA found it
effective to utilize both the analysis based on the "value added
cost" (that is, on the cost of the value adding steps) and one based
on "value added leverage." This latter analysis is management's
judgement as to the most critical leverage points in the value
chain. This early work by SPA was not followed up in the academic
literature until Porter's book (Competitive Advantage, 1986) drew
attention to the concept and expanded its application. The value
chain is a pictorial representation of the sequence of activity the
organization engages in, as it adds value to its product or service
as it moves from the initial stages of what it does through to the
delivery of a product to the customer. Figure B shows the two
classes of activity, those directly associated with the process of
"manufacturing" the goods and services and those that are necessary
support to those direct steps. Organizing this "value chain" as a
percent of cost leads to insights and provides a way of focusing on
those steps that clearly account for a large proportion of the
organization's cost structure. Such steps very often are the ones
that offer the greatest potential for I.T. application. Such a view
also makes it clear which steps might be linked to other
11
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organizations in joint ventures, or perhaps which piece of the value
chain might be removed all together and contracted out to somebody
else.
To repeat a point made above, the concepts are merely vehicles
for management to discuss the potential of their businesses and hence
where information technology might be used. The value added leverage
step is one that is much less dependent on hard costs and much more
dependent on management's informed judgement. Value added leverage
refers to those steps in the "value chain" where management feels the
organization has a unique advantage or where there is the most
powerful form of leverage. For example, an oil company arguably gets
its greatest leverage from finding oil in the first place. It is
relatively unimportant how efficiently it manages the manufacturing
and delivery process if it is in fact sitting on huge supplies of low
cost oil. In this case, the exploration stage in the "value chain"
is the one with the greatest leverage, although its costs may be
proportionately small.
These two frameworks (industry structure and value chain) are
particularly useful because together they force the organization to
think about how it does its business and ways in which that could be
changed, as well as explicitly forcing attention on the external
variables which impact the firm.
11
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Both of these points of view, then, encourage thinking about
"electronic integration" which seems to be one of the major ways
which information technology is having an impact on corporate
strategy. However, beyond frameworks that suggest particularly
powerful points at which technology may be utilized there has also
been some useful work on the process of thinking through strategy
formulation itself. The most well known of these is Rockart's
Critical Success Factors methodology which was developed initially
for use by managers in planning their information needs [14]. Its
initial success in the domain of information systems has been
overshadowed by the use of the technique as a mechanism to get
managers to think through what are the critical dimensions of their
jobs, the ones to which they must pay undivided attention.
Obviously, if an organization can agree on those things that must be
done uniquely well for it to be successful it has gone a long way in
identifying its strategic thrusts.
Recent work by Henderson [15] has built on the foundation that
Rockart established by identifying the Critical Assumption Set that a
group of managers share. He has shown it is important to get at the
assumptions that underlie the critical success factors in order to
get to the core of what really needs to be done to move the
organization forward. These two conceptual frameworks are being used
to stimulate thinking and creativity by managers. The CSF
methodology adds a definitive process that results in articulating
and sharing the organization's direction. These have been shown in
numerous organizations to be analytically useful and to result in
changed behavior [16, 17].
______ __
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There is another perspective which is being explored and seems to
yield a different set of insights that are in many ways wider and
more pervasive than those in the first two analytical frameworks.
This third framework arose out of two important streams of
fundamental research that were done in the 1950s and 1960s. The
first of these is the work done by Alfred Chandler, a business
historian, who wrote an important book in the early '60s [18]. In
this book he developed the thesis that an organization's strategy
changes over time and, as it changes, the organization adjusts its
structure to match the new strategy. Although this point is regarded
as obvious today it is nonetheless a powerful point. At about the
same time, Harold Leavit produced an article [19] based on an
evaluation of the organizational behavior literature and studies that
had been done to that point. In this article he established a case
that an organization could be thought of as consisting of four
important sets of forces. These were the tasks that the organization
has to accomplish (in some ways its strategy), the organization
structure it employs, the people in the organization and their
skills, and the technology that is utilized. The technology in this
case was not information technology so much as it was any of the
technologies, e.g., telephone, materials, manufacturing process,
etc. At the time, this was a novel and powerful way of viewing
organizations and it had the added advantage of being well grounded
in fundamental research.
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In addition to Chandler and Leavit there was also at this period
of time the development of the "scenario" school of corporate
strategy [20]. This school developed both methodologies and check
lists but at the heart of their work was the idea that the external
environment could most usefully be examined in context of its social,
political, economic and technical components. Their work had a big
influence in the '60s but fell out of favour until its recent revival
[21].
If these three streams of work are combined together one arrives
at the diagram given below. This diagram [24] recognizes that an
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organization can usefully be thought of as a set of forces existing
in a state of dynamic equilibrium. On the one hand you have its
strategy, the mission it wishes to accomplish, and all the tasks that
make up that mission. You also have its organization structure and,
more importantly perhaps, the corporate culture that makes the
structure become alive and vibrant. You also have the people, and
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not only the people themselves, but the roles they are being asked to
play. For example, a person as head of marketing becomes a very
different individual than when he/she becomes the head of
manufacturing. The fourth major set of forces are the technologies
that are available, particularly the information technologies as
defined previously. Holding all these four forces together are the
management processes; the planning, the budgeting, and the control
systems as well as the informal processes that represent the way the
organization does its business. All these sets of forces exist in an
external environment which consists of the social, political,
economic and technical factors. These changing factors can impact
any one of the sets of organizational forces although principally of
course they are reflected in the strategy of the organization.
In the context of this diagram then, information technology can
be seen to be a force in its own right and it certainly has a direct
impact on the strategies that are available to an organization. An
example is American Hospital Supply (AHS) [22] and its choice of a
mechanism to give them sustainable competitive advantage in the
market place. AHS took information technology, gave its customers a
terminal, and allowed the customers to order directly from AHS. This
gave the customer cost savings and quicker response and higher
quality and gave AHS the ability to know more about its customers,
their ordering patterns and their tastes. The combination was a
situation where both parties gained. It was also true that AHS's
competitors had a hard time breaking through the barrier of installe)
terminal systems to sell to these customers. There are hundreds of
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examples [231 of similar I.T. uses for competitive advantage.
However, as this diagram suggests, the external environment is the
major driving force for the strategy, the technology is merely
enabling the strategy to be accomplished. In addition, there are
three other sets of forces which clearly impact this technology
strategy linkage. One can have the best idea in the world but if the
organization structure and corporate culture are inconsistent with
this idea then it is likely to come to nothing. Similarly, if the
strategic vision of technology assumes a set of skills and attitudes
of the people in the organization that is inconsistent with the
culture and the reality of peoples' expectations then it is likely
the whole experience will fail. Such an outcome is made even more
likely if the management processes and reward schemes continue to
reflect the old ways of doing business and not the new. Thus it can
be seen that any attempt to formulate I.T. strategies without
thinking very carefully about the implications that such a strategy
would hold for the structure, the people, and the processes, is
likely to fail.
An expanded version of this line of thinking was the conceptual
origin of a project at the Sloan School of Management at MIT called
Management in the 1990s [24]. This is a five year research program
involving 15-20 faculty at the Sloan School together with ten
corporate sponsors who are giving MIT $5 million to conduct research
on the impact of information technology. Our concern is not with
information technology per se but the impact it will have on the
processes, strategy, structure, people, and human resource practices
_iaPI_ -1II1--_1I_. Xli--llll_--^. .. _
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in organizations. Our sponsors consist of three manufacturing firms,
British Petroleum, General Motors, and Eastman Kodak, three service
organizations, American Express, Arthur Young, and the Internal
Revenue Service and four firms involved in information technology
namely International Computers Ltd., Digital Equipment Corporation,
BellSouth, and MCI. The research program is in its third year and is
producing a whole series of papers and working conferences. The
papers are in the public domain and are available from MIT'
although the conferences remain limited to the sponsors until the
ideas and conclusions become better formed. Already it is clear that
there has been a major impact on organizations as a result of I.T.
and in many of the most successful cases this impact has gone
straight to the core of the way they do their basic business.
The Future
The impacts of information technology which the researchers in
the 1990s program are finding would not be of such major significance
if it were not for the fact that there is no indication that changes
are slowing down. That is, the external environment shows every sign
Management in the 1990s Research Program
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Sloan School of Management
1 Amherst Street
Cambridge, MA 02139 (617) 253-0585
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of continuing to experience major changes over the next several
years. These changes will in turn demand that organizations adapt to
them. Such adaptation can be facilitated by the creative use of
information technology. This technology is itself continuing to
change. Recent technological breakthroughs suggest that the changes
will affect some areas in major ways.
The first of these is in the hardware/software domain. The
continuing drop in hardware costs plus developments in software
architecture have resulted in machines that have now fallen below a
cost threshold. For example in 1986 it is possible to buy a "LISP"
machine at around the $15,000 level which can deal with languages
particularly suitable for qualitative knowledge and its manipulation
and be coupled with a knowledge base of a usefully realistic size.
The second breakthrough is conceptual in nature. Herbert Simon
in the 1950s first raised the idea of heuristics and its place in the
field of Artificial Intelligence. Since then there has been a lot of
work by many able researchers that have got us to the point [25]
where it is possible to capture and work with judgemental qualitative
knowledge of acknowledged experts. This has resulted in the
so-called "expert systems" which are an interesting development in
the field. But to the extent they replace human judgement they can
do so only in very limited domains and therefore are of marginal
importance to corporate strategy over the next ten years. However,
the concept of "expert systems" and artificial intelligence can be
used to build "expert support systems" (ESS). These take the
concepts of "expert systems" but apply them to an interactive system
_ _I_1XII___II____
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that leaves a manager very much in the loop in a crucial part of the
decision making process.
The conceptual breakthroughs that allow one to build the
software for an "expert support system" coupled with the enormous
drop in cost of the hardware has resulted in an economically viable
combination which for the first time gives us the tools to attack
directly the challenge of working with qualitative judgemental
information [26]. This passage from data in the early 1960s to
information in the 1970s to knowledge in the 1980s is of fundamental
significance and opens up another class of problems for which an
organization must have an effective strategy.
This "knowledge era" matters since knowledge workers have
scarcely been touched thus far. We have done a lot with computers
over the last 25 years to help the well understood, routine,
repetitive tasks that have to do with the transaction processing
activities of an organization. More recently we have begun to work
on the physical manufacturing process via robots. The advent of low
cost viable telecommunications has allowed us to link remote sites
together and capture transaction processing data closer to the source
and integrate it more tightly with the organization. However, the
tasks that have been affected have been largely clerical, such as
payroll, order entry, inventory control and keeping track of the
day-to-day routine things. More judgemental areas such as assessing
the credit risk of a possible loan candidate or configuring the
components of a complicated customer order do not yield to the old
Ih1
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concepts and "sequential" hardware architecture that we have had to
work with thus far. The new science of knowledge engineering,
capturing heuristics, and the availability of "parallel
architectures" at reasonable prices offer the tools that will allow
us to increasingly deal with these judgemental areas.
Given the continuous changes in the environment and in the
technology the formulation of an I.T. strategy is tricky. It must
involve line managers thinking creatively and it must involve dealing
effectively with the management of change. In addition, it involves
the challenge of getting both the I.T. professionals and the line
managers to engage in a constructive dialogue. From the evidence we
have collected thus far in the 1990s program, it would appear that
the firms which have used I.T. successfully are the ones who have
succeeded in starting such a dialogue. In order to get this
effective dialogue it appears that one way to start, is to start. It
certainly seems clear that the business world is not waiting for
those who are slow to begin this process as is evident from the host
of corporate takeovers. The 1990s it appears will continue to be a
time of change.
1_1__1_( _11____
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